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Abstract—Radio Frequency IDentification based systems are
getting pervasively deployed in many real-life applications in
various settings for identification and authentication of remote
objects. However, the messages that are transmitted over a
insecure channel, are vulnerable to security and privacy concerns
such as data privacy, location privacy of tag owner and etc.
Recently, Yeh et al.’s proposed a RFID authentication protocol
based on quadratic residue which is claimed to provide location
privacy and prevent possible attacks. In this paper, we formally
analyzed the protocol and we proved that the protocol provides
destructive privacy according to Vaudenay privacy model. More-
over, we proposed a unilateral authentication protocol and we
prove that our protocol satisfies higher privacy level such as
narrow strong privacy. Besides, we proposed an enhanced version
of our proposed protocol, which has same privacy level as Yeh
at al protocol, but has reader authentication against stronger
adversaries. Furthermore, the enhanced version of our protocol
uses smaller number of cryptographic operations when compared
to Yeh at al protocol and it is also cost efficient at the server and
tag side and requires O(1) complexity to identify a RFID tag.
Index Terms—RFID, Privacy, Security, Quadratic Residue.
1. INTRODUCTION
Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID), which is one of
the most important ubiquitous technologies, is widely adopted
in the enterprises for inventory checking and management.
It is a common way of remote object identification and
authentication, uses radio wave signals.
A typical RFID system consists of three main components:
the transponder or RFID tag, the transceiver or RFID reader,
and the back-end database. RFID readers are commonly com-
posed of an RF module, a control unit, and a coupling element
to interrogate the tags by means of RF communication [11].
It is assumed that an attacker is able to monitor and intercept
the communications between readers and tags, however, the
interactions between the readers and the back-end database
are secure. In RFID systems, the tagged object does not need
to be in the line of sight but earlier technologies such as the
barcode and smart cards do. This is a significant difference
between RFID and the earlier technologies.
On account of the ease of deployment and low cost, RFID
technology has been widely deployed into many daily life
applications such as automation technology, supply chain man-
agement, transportation, and even passport identification [18].
Such use of RFID raises security and privacy concerns against
strong adversary such as location privacy of tag owner, con-
fidentiality, availability and etc. Since RFID labels used in
daily life applications are low-cost devices and have limited
resources, the challenge on addressing the security and privacy
concerns are much harder than traditional technology.
Besides the passion of having secure authentication pro-
tocols, entire system performance has become an important
issue. Since, designing authentication protocol without sac-
rificing security and privacy begets decreasing efficiency of
whole system. However, achieving the security and privacy
properties, the complexity in tag and server side can vary
dramatically from one protocol to another. Hence, while
handling security and privacy issues, it is also important to
realize them with less computational complexity in the server
and tag side.
In order to resolve these security and privacy issues, nu-
merous RFID authentication protocols have been recently
proposed in the literature [1], [5], [7]–[9], [12], [15]. Many
of them are failed to provide security and privacy and the
computation on the server side is also very high. Recently, Yeh
et al. proposed an improvement of the RFID authentication
protocol [6] which utilizes quadratic residue for security and
privacy [17]. It requires constant time at the server side for
identification; however, this proposal has lack of a formal
security and privacy analysis.
Our Contributions. In this paper, we first present an analysis
of Yeh et al. authentication protocol according to Vaudenay’s
model and prove that this protocol satisfies at most destruc-
tive privacy but the tag and reader authentication are secure
against at most weak adversary. Then, we propose a unilateral
authentication protocol which achieves narrow strong privacy.
After that, we proposed an enhanced version of proposed
protocol, which satisfies mutual authentication with reader
authentication against stronger adversaries, achieves destruc-
tive privacy according to Vaudenay’s model. Note that, our
proposed protocol and enhanced version of it need constant-
time complexity to identify and authenticate a tag.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we give
a brief discussion on Vaudenay’s security and privacy model,
and formal model on security. Section 3 describes Yeh et al..’s
proposed protocol and gives its security and privacy analysis.
In Section 4, the first proposed protocol with security and
privacy analysis is given in a detail. In Section 5, analysis of
our second mutual protocol is given in a detail. In Section 6,
we conclude the paper.
2. FORMAL TOOLS FOR SECURITY AND PRIVACY
ANALYSIS
We divide this section into two parts. In the first part, we
summarize Vaudenay’s privacy model. In the second part, we
give brief information about ProVerif which is a tool used in
security analysis.
A. Vaudenay’s privacy model
Vaudenay’s privacy model [16] is one of the most systematic
and generic models, so we apply this model for our privacy
analysis. In Vaudenay model, one can see the boundaries of a
strong malicious adversary who can monitor all communica-
tions, trace tags within a limited period of time, corrupt tags,
and get side channel information on the reader output [16].
Vaudenay defines an RFID scheme by following procedures.
• SETUPREADER(1s) : This algorithm first creates a public
key pair (KP ,KS) and initializes its database DB.
• SETUPTAGKP (ID): This algorithm produces a tag secret
K and the initial state S of a tag with ID. If it is a valid
tag, the pair (ID,K) is added to DB.
An adversary A communicates with the RFID system with
generic eight oracles defined in [16].
Vaudenay also defines eight adversarial classes with differ-
ent capabilities.
Definition 2.1. (Adversary Classes [16]) An adversary A is
a p.p.t. algorithm which has arbitrary number of access to
all oracles described above. Weak A uses all oracles except
CORRUPT oracle. Forward A is allowed to use only CORRUPT
oracle after her first call to the oracle. Destructive A cannot
use any oracles against a tag after an CORRUPT oracle on
the tag. Strong A uses all oracles defined above without any
restrictions. Narrow A has no access to RESULT oracle.
An RFID scheme is given with three cryptographic proper-
ties such as correctness, security, and privacy. Correctness is
implicitly assumed. The security definition is already defined
in [16]. Here, we present the privacy game of Vaudenay as
follows.
Definition 2.2. (Privacy [16]). The adversaries who start with
an attack phase allowing oracle queries then pursuing an
analysis phase with no oracle query. In between phases, the
adversary receives the hidden table T of the DrawTag oracle
then outputs either true or false. The adversary wins if the
output is true. We say that the RFID scheme is P-private if all
such adversaries which belong to class P are trivial following
Definition 2.3.
Definition 2.3. (Blinder [16]) A blinder B is a simulator
which simulates the LAUNCH, SENDREADER, SENDTAG, and
RESULT oracles without having access to the secret keys
and the database. When a blinded adversary AB makes the
LAUNCH, SENDREADER, SENDTAG, and RESULT queries,
she is answered through the blinder B.
Remark 1. The blinder B is consistent and acts like a real
reader in a way that if a protocol transcript’s inputs are
derived as a result of usage of oracles to B, the answer
given by B to the RESULT oracle on this protocol transcript
is 1. If all inputs of a protocol transcript are not derived as
a result of usage of oracles to B, then the answer given by
B to the RESULT oracle on this protocol transcript depends
on the appearance probability of missing inputs on protocol
transcript. Besides, B holds all its answers to the oracles used
by A in its database and answers the new oracles depending
on its database.
Note that, in this paper, in all protocol descriptions, tags
only include TID as a tag related information. Hence, when
RESULT oracle is applied, for the current protocol run, the
notion of privacy is meaningless. Thus,we look for privacy
for protocol runs where CORRUPT oracle takes place. As a
reference, following remark can be given.
Remark 2. In this paper, the adversary is not allowed to
distinguish between the real system and the blinder at protocol
runs where CORRUPT oracle takes place.
B. Security Analysis
Securing a system is a complex problem since it requires
a careful analysis of the underlying assumptions about cryp-
tographic functions and trusted parties, and an accurate im-
plementation of hardware and software. Satisfying all these
requirements is virtually impossible without the use of for-
mal analytical techniques [13] which are invaluable tools for
identifying weaknesses in security protocols.
In order to verify formally whether an authentication pro-
tocol achieves a certain security property, we first create a
model which specifies the capability of an adversary. Then, we
describe the interactions of the adversary in this model and the
definition of the security property within the model. Finally,
by using this model, a formal tool checks whether the goals
in the security protocol are achieved or not. Recently, several
different symbolic formal models have been proposed in the
literature [2], [3], [14]. In our analysis, we use ProVerif [3]
which is automatic tool to verify a wide range of security of
cryptographic protocols.
Properties of the processes described in the applied pi-
calculus can be proved by automated tools ProVerif [4].
ProVerif first translates the applied pi-calculus process into
a set of Horn clauses. These clauses account for the initial
knowledge of the attacker and the inference rules she can apply
to broaden her knowledge pool for the messages. ProVerif can
prove reachability properties that are typical of model checking
tools such as correspondence assertions, and observational
equivalence. ProVerif can also reconstruct an execution trace
that falsifies the desired property: when a desired property
cannot be proved. Furthermore, in ProVerif analysis, protocol
analysis is considered in accordance with an infinite number of
sessions, an unbounded message space and parallel sessions.
3. YEH ET AL.’S PROPOSED PROTOCOL AND ITS PRIVACY
ANALYSIS
In this section, we first present Yeh et al.’s authentication
protocol [17] by considering the server and the reader as
a single entity, just reader, since the channel between these
two entities is assumed to be secure. Then, we analyze the
protocol according to Vaudenay privacy model. We prove that
this protocol satisfies destructive privacy. The protocol steps
are described as follows.
Let h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}α be a hash function and PRNG :
{0, 1}α → {0, 1}α be a pseudo-random number generator.
Let r, s, t, n ∈ {0, 1}α. Each tag T is equipped with a unique
TID and stores the value n and r. These values are given
by reader in the initialization phase. Reader stores the values
h(TID), TID, r, rold where rold = r at the beginning.
In the protocol, the reader R first sends a random challenge
s ∈R {0, 1}α to a tag T . Once T receives the challenge, T
picks another random challenge t ∈R {0, 1}α. T constructs
x, y,X,R and T respectively, then sends X,R, T, h(x), h(y)
and h(t) to R. Then, R gets (x1, x2, x3, x4) and (t1, t2, t3, t4)
by solving X = x2 mod n and T = t2 mod n by using the
factors of n, which are p and q. After that R, determines
correct values of x and t by comparing h(xi)
?
= h(x) and
h(ti)
?
= h(t). Then, R determines the correct value of r
in a similar way. R computes h(TID) and seeks TID from
database and compares received r with r or rold. If received
r is valid, then computes acknowledgement message xack =
TID⊕t⊕r or rold, sends h(xack) to T and updates rold as r as
PRNG(r). Then T checks whether h(xack) ?= h(TID)⊕r⊕t.
If it is valid, T updates r as PRNG(r), otherwise the protocol
aborts.
Before starting the security and privacy analysis of the
protocol, we can assume, without loss of generality, there are
one reader and one tag in the system. Since the variables which
change tag to tag at calculation steps are h(TID) and r which
have same bit length as s. Thus, by deriving more s values,
i.e. more protocol runs, we can recover the advantage loss due
to working with one tag instead of many tags.
Theorem 3.1. Yeh et al.’s Proposed Protocol achieves tag
authentication and reader authentication if the adversary Aw
belongs to weak class.
Proof: Let the adversary Aw observes n protocol runs
between the reader and the tag. Let us assume that Aw tries
to impersonate the tag at n + 1th run. If the value of s sent
by the reader is equal to the one of the s values sent at one
of the previous protocol runs, Aw impersonates the tag with
success probability 1. Otherwise, Aw has to guess the values
of h(TID) and r for corresponding run correctly. Thus, the
success probability for Aw to impersonate the tag is n2α +
(1− n2α ) 122m , which is negligible. Hence, the system achieves
tag authentication if the adversary is weak.
Similarly, if Aw tries to impersonate the reader, then Aw
sends a challenge s to the tag. Upon receiving the challenge,
the tag responses with X,R, T, h(x), h(y), h(t) according to
which t value the tag chooses. However, as Aw does not know
the value of r, Aw can not figure out the value of t. Moreover,
since Aw does not know the factors of n, which are p and q,
Aw can not the roots of X and R and T . Besides, Aw has
to guess correct value of TID. Thus, the probability that Aw
sends correct h(xack) to the tag is 122m , which is negligible.
Therefore, the system achieves the reader authentication if the
adversary is in class of weak.
Theorem 3.2. Yeh et al.’s proposed protocol achieves destruc-
tive privacy but does not achieve narrow strong privacy.
Proof: Let there are one reader and one tag in the system
and let Ad be a destructive adversary. Assume to the contrary,
the protocol does not achieve destructive privacy. That is,
the adversary Ad can distinguish between the real RFID
system and the system simulated by the B with non negligible
probability.
Let start with how B evaluates oracles:
• Launch(): Evaluated in a trivial way.
• SendReader(pi): The output is s ∈R {0, 1}α.
• SendTag(s, pi): The output is X,R, T, h(x), h(y), h(t).
• SendReader((X,R, T, h(x), h(y), h(t)),pi): The output is
h(xack).
• Result(pi): This oracle works as defined in Remark 1
Let the system is run n times only by the real RFID system
or B and let Ad applies CORRUPT oracle at n+ 1th protocol
run. Ad gets the values of TID, n and rn+1, tn+1, xn+1, yn+1
as a result of CORRUPT oracle usage.
There are three ways for Ad to distinguish between the
real reader from the blinder. The first way is Ad’s guessing
the correct value of r at any protocol run. If this is the case,
then by using the relation R = (r2modn) ⊕ t formula, Ad
gets the value of t for the corresponding round. Moreover,
Ad gets the values of x, y, X , T values of the corresponding
round. Furthermore, as Ad can calculate next rounds’ r value,
in a similar way Ad gets the values of t, x,y, X , T values
for each advancing protocol run. Therefore, if Ad correctly
guesses r value at least 1 protocol run, then Ad can check
correctness of the protocol at next protocol runs. Therefore,
in this case, the adversary distinguishes the real system from
the blinder. However, realization of this case has probability
at most 1 − (1 − 12α ), which is negligible. The next way forAd is to guess the correct value of h(ack) at any protocol run.
Similarly, the realization of this case has probability at most
1− (1− 12α ), which is negligible.
The last way is Ad’s determining the value that is produced
by Result oracle is right or wrong. By contradiction assump-
tion, Ad’s success probability at this case is non-negligible as
the success probability of previous two ways are negligible.
However, this contradicts with the Theorem 3.1 as in our
case, for past protocol runs, destructive adversary acts like
weak adversary as r values of previous protocol runs can not
be deduced from the knowledge of rn+1. Thus, the protocol
achieves destructive privacy.
Let As be a narrow strong adversary. In this case, let As
corrupts the tag before starting any protocol run. As indicated
above, As gets the value of r, and due to the nature of PRNG
functions, As can calculate the value of r in any advancing
run. Therefore, she can calculate the value of t, x,y, X and
T at each protocol run. Hence, As can distinguish the real
system from the blinder. Thus, the protocol does not achieve
narrow strong privacy.
4. THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
In this section, we first present a novel scalable RFID
authentication protocol which is based on quadratic residue.
Then, we give security and privacy analysis of it according to
Vaudenay model.
Let h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}κ be a hash function. Let
s, n, t ∈ {0, 1}α. Each tag T is equipped with a unique TID
and stores the value n. These values are given by reader R in
the initialization phase. R stores the values h(TID) and TID.
The authentication protocol is summarized in Figure 1, the
upper part of dashed line.
In the protocol, R first sends a random challenge s ∈R
{0, 1}α to a tag T . Once T receives the challenge, T picks
another random challenge t ∈R {0, 1}α. T constructs x,X, T
and M respectively, then sends X,T and M to R. Once R
receives X,T and M , it gets (x1, x2, x3, x4) and (t1, t2, t3, t4)
by solving X = x2 mod n and T = t2 mod n by the help
of factors on n. After that R, determines correct values of
x and t by comparing h(xi||tj) ?= M . Now, R can compute
h(TID) and then check existence of TID in the database.
A. Privacy Analysis
Before starting the security analysis of the proposed proto-
col, Note that, we can assume there is one reader and one tag
in the system. Since the variables which change tag to tag at
calculation steps are h(TID) which has same bit length as s.
Thus, by deriving more s values, i.e. more protocol runs, we
can recover the advantage loss due to working with one tag
instead of many tags.
Theorem 4.1. The proposed RFID protocol achieves tag
authentication if the adversary Aw belongs to the weak class.
Proof: Let the adversary Aw observes n protocol run
between the reader and the tag. First of all, let us assume
that Aw tries to impersonate the tag at n + 1st run. There
are two cases to consider. If the challenge value s sent
by the reader is equal to the one of the s values sent at
previous protocol run, then with 1 success probability, Aw
impersonates the tag. However, the probability of realization
of this scenario is n2α . If this is not the case, then the only way
for Aw to impersonate the tag is to guess the value of h(TID)
correctly. The success probability in this case 12α . Hence, Aw
impersonates the tag with probability n2α +(1− n2α ) 12α , which
is negligible. Therefore, the system achieves tag authentication
if the adversary is weak.
Theorem 4.2. The proposed RFID protocol achieves narrow
strong privacy.
Proof: Before starting the proof steps, note that, for
proposed protocol, in terms of privacy analysis, there is no
real difference between the adversary’s applying CORRUPT
oracle only one time and more than one time. Since, at each
CORRUPT oracle usage, the adversary gets the values of TID
and n, which do not changes among protocol runs and session
specific t and x values and there is no real connection between
any of two protocol runs’ corresponding values. Therefore,
in the proof, the adversary applies the CORRUPT oracle only
once.
Let there are one reader and one tag in the system and let
As be a narrow strong adversary. Assume to the contrary,
the protocol does not achieve narrow strong privacy. That
is, the adversary As can distinguish between the real RFID
system and the system simulated by the B with non negligible
probability.
Let start with how B evaluates oracles:
• Launch(): Evaluated in a trivial way.
• SendReader(pi): The output is s ∈R {0, 1}m.
• SendTag(s, pi): The output is X,T,M .
Let the system is run n times only by the real RFID system
or B. Let As applies CORRUPT oracle at n+1st protocol run
and after that oracle usage, the system run k more times. Note
that, As gets the values of TID, n, tn+1 and xn+1 as a result
of CORRUPT oracle usage.
Note that, there are 2 ways for Aw to distinguish the real
system from the blinder. The first one is to guess t value
correctly at any of previous n protocol runs or next k runs.
The other way is to guess one of the X , T and M value
correctly. Hence, the total success probability of the adversary
is n+k2α + (1 − n+k2α ) 32α , which is negligible. Of course, one
can run this process defined above polynomially bounded time
and increase the adversary’s chance but the resulting success
probability will be at most negligible.
5. AN ENHANCED VERSION OF THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
In this section, we propose an enhanced version of the
proposed protocol(see Figure 1) which satisfies reader authen-
tication against strong adversary and has destructive privacy
level.
The protocol steps of this protocol consists of the unilateral
authentication protocol and the last message sent by reader
to the tag. The reader prepares xack = TID||t||s and sends
h(xack) to the tag. The tag checks validity of h(xack) by
comparing its value with h(TID||t||s). All the steps of the
second protocol are summarized in Figure 1.
A. Privacy Analysis by using Vaudenay’s Model
Theorem 5.1. The protocol depicted in Figure 1 satisfies tag
authentication against weak adversary and satisfies reader
authentication against narrow strong adversary.
Theorem 5.2. The protocol demonstrated at Figure 1 achieves
destructive privacy.
Proof: Let there are one reader and one tag in the system
and let Ad be a destructive adversary. Assume to the contrary,
the protocol does not achieve destructive privacy. That is,
the adversary Ad can distinguish between the real RFID
system and the system simulated by the B with non negligible
probability.
Tag TID Reader R
n, TID p, q, n, TID
t ∈R {0, 1}α (1) s←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− s ∈R {0, 1}α
x = h(TID)⊕ s⊕ h(t)⊕ t
X = x2 mod n, T = t2 mod n
M = h(x||t) (2) X,T,M−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ 1. Solves X = x2 mod n and T = t2 mod n
to get (x1, x2, x3, x4) and (t1, t2, t3, t4)
2. Compares h(xi||tj) ?=M to determine x and t
3. Computes h(TID) = x⊕ s⊕ h(t)⊕ t
4. Check h(TID) exists in database
-if exists
prepares ACK message, xack = TID||s||t
-otherwise
Check h(xack)
?
= h(TID||s||t) (3) h(xack)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− prepares ACK message, xack ∈ {0, 1}∗
Fig. 1. Our proposed narrow strong private scheme.
B evaluates oracles in the same way as indicated at the proof
of Theorem 4.2 with addition:
• SendReader((X,T,M), pi): The output is h(xack).
• Result(pi): This oracle works as defined in Remark 1
Let the system is run n times only by the real RFID system
or B and let Ad applies CORRUPT oracle at n+ 1st protocol
run. Ad gets the values of TID, n and tn+1, xn+1 as a result
of CORRUPT oracle usage.
There are three cases to consider. The first case is Ad’s
guessing the value of t in any of previous n protocol
runs. However, as there is no connection between tn+1 and
previously chosen t values, the realization of first case is
negligible. The second case is Ad’s guessing the correct value
os h(xack). Similarly, the probability of realization of this case
is negligible.
The last way is Ad’s determining the value that is produced
by Result oracle is right or wrong. By contradiction assump-
tion, Ad’s success probability at this case is non-negligible as
the success probability of previous two ways are negligible.
However, this contradicts with the Theorem 5.1 as in our case,
for past protocol runs, destructive adversary acts like weak
adversary. Thus, the protocol achieves destructive privacy.
B. Formal Analysis
In this section, we use ProVerif tool in order to formally
prove the security property of our enhanced protocols such as
reader authentication and tag authentication.
To encode the protocol into the pi-calculus, we first de-
termine the required cryptographic primitives with function
symbols, and rewrite rules and equations over terms. Let
hash() be a universal hash function. Let xor be the function
which satisfies ∀x, y ∈ {0, 1}α, xor(x, y) = x ⊕ y. Note
that, ProVerif cannot evaluate XOR functions properly and so
we provide all possible reduction functions (xor1, . . . , xor8)
which help ProVerif simulate XOR function. Let two large
primes, (P,Q) be a factors of a common modulus N. Then, let
smodulus denote a type of pair of (P,Q) and pmodulus denote
a type of public modulus (N=PQ). The reader stores factors
of a public modulus N P and Q and tag stores the modulus,
publicmod(P and Q).
We also simulate quadratic residue functions, one for taking
modulo square, one for taking modulo square root. ∀x,X ∈
{0, 1}α and pmodulus N ∈ {0, 1}α, square(x,N) is equal to
x2 mod N and ssquare(X,N) gives all possible solutions
to X−2 mod N .
The public channel between reader and tags are described
as free c : channel. The adversary is also allowed to use this
channel for her attack.
Our mutual authentication protocol is expected to satisfy
(informally) the following properties:
• Authentication of tag to reader: if the reader identifies
tag, it responds so that at the end of the protocol, tag
has approval to engage with reader in a session, only if
reader permits it.
• Authentication of reader to tag: similar to the above.
• Secrecy of session keys (combination of s and t).
In our model, we assume secret is a private key shared be-
tween tag and reader which is unknown by the adversary. Our
interest in this model is to verify the secrecy of the bitstring
(t) generated by tag. Therefore, as soon as tag authenticates
reader, tag broadcasts secret XORed with the generated t
(out(c, secret ⊕ t)). If there is no way that an adversary
can derive secret by applying the rules, then the protocol
is safe. Namely, the authentication procedure has not been
compromised. In order to challenge the adversary, we write
the query syntax, as the following: query attacker(secret).
The behaviour of the reader is encoded into following
process, Reader. In this process, the reader waits any message
from tag on channel in(c : channel, data). It sends any mes-
sage to tag through the same channel (out(c : channel, data)).
1. let Reader(TID:bitstring ) = new s:bitstring;
2. (* Message 1 *) out(c, s);
3. (* Message 2 *)
4. in(c, (X:bitstring, T:bitstring, M:bitstring));
5. let x = ssquare(X,P and Q) in
6. let t = ssquare(T,P and Q) in
7. let (=M) = hash((x,t)) in
8. let HTID = hash(TID) in let HT = hash(t) in
9. let (=HTID) = xor1(xor1(xor1(x,HT),t),s)
10. in event readerAuthTag(s,t);(* Message 3 *)
11. out(c, hash((TID,s,t))); 0.
The behaviour of the tag is encoded into following process:
12. let Tag(TID:bitstring, N : pmodulus) =
13. (* Message 1 *)
14. in(c, s:bitstring); new t:bitstring ;
15. let HT = hash(t) in let HTID = hash(TID) in
16. let x = ssquare(X,P and Q) in
17. let X = square(x,N) in let T = square(t,N) in
18. let M = hash((x,t)) in
19. (* Message 2 *) out(c,(X,T,M)); (* Message 3 *)
20. in(c, ack:bitstring);
21. let (=ack) = hash((TID,s,t)) in
22. event tagAuthReader(s,t);
23. out(c, xor(secret,t)) ;0.
These two processes are executed multiple times in parallel
using the following syntax:
24. process
25. let N = publicmod(P and Q) in out (c,N);
26. new TID:bitstring;
27. (!Reader(TID) | !Tag(TID,N ) | phase 1; out(c,TID))
In this process, we first created a public modulus N, which
is sent through channel c. Then we create a new TID for a tag
identifier. This TID and the private products of N (P and Q)
are given to reader. ProVerif first converts these processes and
adversary actions into a set of Horn clauses [10] so as to
automatically prove queries. Then, it runs the processes and
searches for a valid security gap based on requested queries.
The output of ProVerif confirms that the attacker cannot derive
the term (secret) so the authentication procedure can be
performed successfully without being compromised. Also, the
attacker is not be able to cheat both reader and tag even if we
provide TID of the victim tag to adversary in phase 1.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we first give a formal security and privacy
analysis of Yeh et al.’s authentication protocol. We proved that
this protocol provides at most destructive privacy according
Vaudenay model whereas the tag and reader authentication is
secure against at most weak adversary. Then, we introduced
an unilateral authentication protocol and we formally proved
that this protocol achieves narrow strong adversary. We also
proposed the enhanced version of the protocol that provides
reader authentication. We proved that the second protocol
satisfies destructive privacy and the reader authentication is
secure against narrow strong adversary.
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